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ABSTRACT. This paper provides a critique of the contemporary notion of intellectual
property based on the consequences of Wittgenstein’s “private language argument”. The
reticence commonly felt toward recent applications of patent law, e.g., sports moves, is
held to expose erroneous metaphysical assumptions inherent in the spirit of current IP
legislation. It is argued that the modern conception of intellectual property as a kind of
natural right, stems from the mistaken internalist or Augustinian picture of language that
Wittgenstein attempted to diffuse. This view becomes persuasive once it is shown that a
complete understanding of the argument against private language must include Wittgen-
stein’s investigation of the role of the will in the creative process. It is argued that original
thought is not born by decree of the will, but engendered by a public context of meaning and
value. What marks a person as a genius is, therefore, according to Wittgenstein, not some
sovereign capacity of conceptual world-making, but merely a propitious dose of intellectual
courage.
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Ce qui est le plus souvent interne à ce qu’on appelle
l’“acte” c’est qu’il se méconnaît
lui-même.
(Claude Levi-Strauss)
One of the fundamental assumptions or “pictures” that Wittgenstein was
most intent on dispelling is what he called the idea of “private language”.
This internalistic conception of meaning has dominated Western philos-
ophy since Descartes and continues to exert such a profound influence
that it has become the dominant research paradigm for cognitive science.1
The formidable propagation of this idea throughout intellectual history is
certainly not merely the result of Descartes’ genius. Human experience,
1 According to Descartes, mental events and states belong to a private psychical world
inaccessible to public observation. A. Kenny offers a convincing account of the continuing
widespread influence of this view in “Descartes’ Myth”, chapter one of his book The
Metaphysics of Mind (Oxford University Press, 1989), 1–16. For a more sustained Wittgen-
steinian critique of residual Cartesianism in cognitive science, see D. Proudfoot, “On
Wittgenstein on Cognitive Science”, Philosophy (April 1997), 72, 189–217.
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on its most ordinary level, is made up of innumerable mental events lived
by the individual. One’s sensations, sentiments, and intentions are surely
one’s own. It is, therefore, entirely natural to believe that we all possess a
certain imaginative autonomy. All that we represent to ourselves mentally
is ours, for we produce those ideas ourselves by acts of will.
This essentially individualistic aspect of human consciousness under-
lies not only the tendency to adopt the internalistic model of language, but
also the tendency to attribute singular ideas to singular individuals. The
laws governing what is called “intellectual property”, appeal as much to
the practical needs of encouraging and protecting authors and inventors,
as they do to the deeper sentiment that such laws preserve a good that is
so fundamental that one is almost tempted to call it a natural right: The
right of individuals to be recognized as the masters of their own ideas. We
shall see that Wittgenstein shows this assumption to be, in fact, based on
erronious metaphysical foundations and that these continue to provide for
the development of various questionable practices of intellectual property
law today.2 In conclusion, I will attempt to clear the way for a more sound
treatment of this rapidly growing legal domain.
Wittgenstein remarks in 1947 that the debate between Newton and
Leibniz, concerning which of the two had actually invented calculus, is the
sort of question that arises from the illusory reflection of human vanity:
I completely understand how someone may find it hateful for the priority of his invention
or discovery to be disputed, and want to defend his priority ‘with tooth and claw’. All
the same this is completely chimerical. It certainly seems to me too cheap, all too easy, for
Claudius to make fun of the squabbles between Newton and Leibniz over who was first; but
it’s nevertheless true, I think, that this quarrel is simply the expression of evil weaknesses
and fostered by VILE people. Just what would Newton have lost if he had acknowledged
Leibniz’s originality? Absolutely nothing! He would have gained a lot. And yet, how hard
it is to acknowledge something of this sort: Someone who tries it feels as though he were
confessing his own incapacity. Only people who hold you in esteem and at the same time
love you can make it easy for you to behave like this.
It’s a question of envy of course. And anyone who experiences it ought to keep on telling
himself: “It’s a mistake! It’s a mistake! –”.3
And also during the same period he writes:
Is what I am doing really worth the effort? Yes, but only if light shines on it from above.
And if that happens – why should I concern myself that the fruits of my labours should not
be stolen? If what I am writing really has some value, how could anyone steal the value
from me? And if the light from above is lacking, I can’t in any case be more than clever.4
2 The following discussion shall be framed primarily within the context of patent law.
Though a Wittgensteinian critique might be extended to other areas of IP law (particularly
copyright), those areas proper are beyond the scope of this piece.
3 L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (University of Chicago Press, 1980), 58e.
4 Ibid., at 57–8e.
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Wittgenstein is attempting to expose here the chimera of human vanity,
thinking itself capable of manufacturing the precious and the meaningful
by sheer force of will. Wittgenstein considered this illusion to be at the
source of Russellian conventionalism, and it would seem that it is still
somewhat operative in the internalistic models of cognitive science today.
According to the atomistic conventionalism eventually held by Russell
(ironically through the partial influence of the early Wittgenstein), meaning
is entirely made up of simple verbal conventions, reducible to a small and
limited number of words.5 An individual would hence be capable of estab-
lishing certain elemental facts of meaning by acts of will. Russell holds
that all linguistic conventions are simply established in the following way:
“Suppose, for example, that you are counting pound notes. By an act of
will, you establish a one-one relation between the several notes and the
numbers 1, 2, 3, etc., until there are no notes left”.6 For Russell, then,
logical propositions assert facts of meaning which are verified entirely by
their own transparency.7
The picture of language projected by this reductionistic convention-
alism necessarily includes a private language within which to establish an
ostensive relation between the signifier and the signified. Wittgenstein calls
this theory the “Augustinian picture of language” and immediately sets out
to deconstruct it at the very beginning of his Philosophical Investigations.
The essence of Wittgenstein’s critique is that to root all meaning in internal
convention is to initiate an infinite regress.8 For as he points out: “no course
of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can
be made out to accord with the rule”.9 If facts of meaning are verified only
by other facts of the same kind, then there is “no criterion of correctness.
One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And
that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’ ”.10 Unlike natural
laws governing phenomena, rules governing behavior are conventional,
which is to say that one can only follow a rule if one can also break
it.11 It would, therefore, be absurd to presume that the origin of language
5 B. Russell, “Is Mathematics Purely Linguistic?”, in D. Lackey, ed., Essays in Analysis
(New York: G. Brazillier, 1973), 306.
6 B. Russell, My Philosophical Development (London: Routledge, 1993), 55.
7 Wittgenstein famously shows, however, that logical propositions assert nothing
about meaning and correct usage – they determine them tautologically. Tractatus logico-
philosophicus (London: Routledge, 1961), §4.461.
8 This criticism applies equally to all internalistic models of language acquisition
currently dominating cognitive science. See D. Proudfoot, supra n. 1.
9 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953), §201.
10 Ibid., §258.
11 See Kenny, supra n. 1, at 154–155.
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is essentially characterized by a sort of magical baptism delivered either
by individual acts of will or biological law.12 Grammatical facts do not
originate internally in mental gestures of private experience or in hidden
brain functions and genetic programming. Propositions can only reflect
the public grammatical background by which correct usage is determined
and verified. To say the opposite, namely, that grammar itself is geneti-
cally given through emergent psychophysical processes or the product of
primordial acts of private ostensive definition, is to put the cart before the
horse. For a word to obtain a role, it must have a place within an entire
public system of linguistic convention. Hence, Wittgenstein reminds us
that language is a form of life, by directing our attention to the artificiality
of a purely invented language:
Esperanto. The feeling of disgust we get if we utter an invented word with invented
derivative syllables. The word is cold, lacking in associations, and yet it plays at being
‘language’. A system of purely written signs would not disgust us so much.13
If meaning does not ultimately originate in private acts of will, then
the same must be true of value. However, there still subsists what can be
generally referred to as the “myth of genius”: The notion of the extraordi-
narily gifted human being capable of creating whole worlds of private
meaning and consequence, never entirely accessible even to those who
have dedicated their entire lives to the study of his or her work. According
to Wittgenstein, this concept is deeply rooted in the philosophical myth
of “private language”, or in what Jacques Bouveresse calls the “Myth of
Interiority”.14 The idea of a work of art expressing the mysterious internal
life of the artist remains an essential factor in determining the importance
of myriad works of famous and even not so famous artists. This myth is
part of the reason why today, as Foucault points out, literary anonymity is
intolerable.
Literary discourses have come to be accepted only when endowed with the author-function.
We now ask of each poetic or fictional text: from where does it come, who wrote it, when,
under what circumstances, or beginning with what design? The meaning ascribed to it and
the status or value accorded it depend upon the manner in which we answer these questions.
And if a text should be discovered in a state of anonymity – whether as a consequence of an
accident or the author’s explicit wish – the game becomes one of rediscovering the author.
Since literary anonymity is not tolerable, we can accept it only in the guise of an enigma.15
12 See L. Wittgenstein, supra n. 9, §38 and “Notes on ‘Private Experience’ and ‘Sense
Data’ ”, R. Rees, ed., Philosophical Review (1936), 77, 275–320.
13 Culture and Value, supra n. 3, at 52e.
14 J. Bouveresse, Le Mythe de l’inte´riorite´ (Paris: Minuit, 1976).
15 M. Foucault, “What Is an Author?”, in J.V. Harari, ed., Textual Strategies (Cornell
University Press, 1979), 149–150.
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But Wittgenstein shows us that it is logically impossible for an individual,
even a brilliant one, to choose for himself what is meaningful, precious, or
beautiful. Try to choose (I do not say acknowledge) the value of something.
If you actually perform this experiment, you will certainly feel a similar
impression to the one Wittgenstein points out in the following remark:
Make the following experiment: Say the sentence “It is hot in this room”, and mean: “It is
cold”. Observe closely what you are doing.16
Similarly, with respect to purely aesthetic value, it is not within our
power to rate for example, Emily Dickinson’s mastery of the English
language below that of, say, George W. Bush. If the attribution of aesthetic,
symbolic, or propositional value were determined by the will, then each of
us would be entirely comfortable performing such tasks. We would then
be able to say for example, “The ceiling of the Sistine Chapel brings tears
to my eyes”, but mean: “The ceiling of the Sistine Chapel gives me a sore
neck” or “Open a window, I feel sick”. We could then literally use anything
whatsoever to convey anything whatsoever. But meaning does not function
in this way. If Wittgenstein asks us to observe closely what we must do to
mean the opposite of what we say, it is because it would be impossible
to live in such a manner. We cannot invent our own cognitive points of
reference. Our world is bounded by rules, and hence Wittgenstein reminds
us that “if a rule does not compel you, then you aren’t following a rule.
But how am I supposed to be following it, if I can after all follow it as I
like?”.17
An individual cannot then be said, properly speaking, to possess his or
her own ideas any more than an individual can be said, properly speaking,
to possess, his or her own sense impressions. That is to say, one’s concep-
tual apparatus belongs to one only as much as one’s sensory apparatus
does – the will being incapable of appropriating either one. The deeds and
gestures of language and behavior are essentially public in nature and can,
therefore, never be borrowed from any single person.
The expression “intellectual property” is, therefore, somewhat gramma-
tically misleading. The act of appropriation is essentially an instantiation
of the will. Ideation, on the contrary, though it may be occasioned by the
will, is never ultimately subject to it. It is certainly true that mental repre-
sentation (intentionality) can in fact be a deliberate act of will. However, a
mental representation can only function in the imagination according to a
given public conceptual background, commonly referred to in the philos-
16 L. Wittgenstein, Blue Book (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 42.
17 L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994), 413.
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ophy of mind as “pre-intentional”.18 Although the intentional continually
influences the pre-intentional in the perpetual transformation of language
games, such changes only occur through transitions between intermediate
cases.19 That is to say, the members of the family of say, woodwind
instruments can each, little by little, transform the overall character of the
woodwind sound. Still, each novel instantiation (real or imagined) will
have to exploit a sufficient quantity of external criteria in order to retain
its identity as a member of the woodwind family.20 This is why, when we
usually speak of “having an idea” we are not referring to a mere repre-
sentation of a particular image, deliberately called to mind. Rather, we are
more referring to a kind of discovery or solution which has finally come to
mind as the result of a certain amount of investigation. One cannot order
oneself to produce an idea in the same way as one can order oneself to
imagine a pink elephant for, in that case, the idea would be immediately
accessible and would, hence, completely lose its revelatory quality.
If we still feel somehow that the artist, author, composer, or inventor
produces a work by sheer representational force of will, it is because we are
only thinking of the intentional content. The creator of a work does indeed
choose certain ingredients, but the reasons for which they are chosen,
and the way in which they become organized will depend on the public
pre-intentional background. Even if he or she deliberately acts against
convention, the result will still be determined by that negation. During the
creative process, it is therefore just as important to listen as it is to dictate.
Ideation is hence essentially the actualization of conceptual potentiality.
We have just shown the absurdity of thinking that the will could itself
determine the extent of that potentiality. It would thus be incoherent to
speak of “possessing a conceptual potentiality”. Accordingly, intellectual
property rights do not purport to protect any claims to conceptual potenti-
ality. They only protect specific ways in which certain potentialities have
become actualities by the intervention of the will. Nevertheless, a concept
is obviously immaterial. Consequently, it cannot be appropriated in the
same way as a physical object. As a result, “one can imagine a culture in
which discourses would circulate and be received without the benefit of
18 See for example, Searle, Intentionality (Cambridge University Press, 1983); and
Johnson, The Body in the Mind (University of Chicago Press, 1987).
19 See Wittgenstein’s remarks on family resemblance, Philosophical Investigations,
supra n. 9, §65–80 and those on the evolution of mathematics, ibid., 204.
20 Notice that such developments often occur without appeal to an individual expert
authority on what does or does not in fact qualify as a legitimate member of the family.
Saxophones for example became universally accepted as Woodwinds without insighting
controversy over the detail that they are in fact entirely made of steel. This was the case
even in such languages as French in which these instruments are simply called “Woods”.
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the author-function. All discourses, whatever their status, form, value, and
whatever the treatment to which they are subjected, would then develop in
the anonymity of a murmur”.21
Intellectual property law, however, does seek to exclude any claims to
ideas or natural laws. One can only patent that which falls within three
categories – procedures, machines, or compositions of matter.22 Essen-
tially, this means the following: Though each person has the right to think
about a patented concept, only the holder of the patent can bring the
concept into physical existence, or give permission to anyone else to do
so. As soon as the concept leaves the domain of thought and becomes
realized into a tangible form, the patent rights apply. Conversely, ideas, are
considered non-patentable and can, therefore, be freely used by anyone.
Hence, during the 1950’s it was possible for example to call oneself
an “existentialist” without having first to obtain written permission from
Jean-Paul Sartre.23
All of this might seem entirely reasonable and unproblematic. However,
as we shall see, there do seem to remain countless ideas that are nonethe-
less patentable. In fact, the expression “intellectual property” would clearly
lose its meaning if it did not apply in some sense to ideas. But in an
attempt to exclude them, intellectual property rights only apply to what is
considered to be a “useful process” that is “new” and “non-obvious” – all
highly interpretive notions.24 And perhaps most importantly, the inventor
must be able to specify the identity of the invention in sufficient detail
for the reader to understand precisely its function.25 If a concept does not
meet these four requirements then it is to be considered a non-patentable
idea. However, evidence that these criteria are not met must not depend
on the patent clerk’s subjective judgement. Even evidence of obviousness
21 M. Foucault, supra n. 15, 160. The first sentence, being absent from the English
version, is translated from the French text “Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?”, Dits et Ecrits
1954–1988 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 800.
22 In addition, most patents are only held for around 17 years. R.M. Kunstadt, F.S. Kieff
and R.G. Kramer, “Intellectual Property”, The National Law Journal (May 20, 1996), C2.
23 This, however, did not keep the members of the surrealist school from attempting to
ban Salvador Dali from the movement after he had begun signing blank canvasses for large
sums of money. Such antics inspired the “real” surrealists to start calling him “Salvador
Dollars”.
24 35 U.S. Constitution 103 (1995). Consequently, one cannot yet patent theoretical
models (their usefulness remains dubious), though one can as of 1998, patent mathematical
formulas, namely, those contained in computer code.
25 Ibid., 112.
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must be publicly observable in the form of actual references in published
literature.26
These general criteria are perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, while
the word ‘game’ cannot be precisely defined, a type of game can be.
Wittgenstein remarks on this in the Investigations:
As things are I can, for example, invent a game that is never played by anyone. – But
would the following be possible too: mankind has never played any games; once, however,
someone invented a game – which no one ever played?27
Gaming, in general, is part of our shared form of life, which is precisely
the reason why it is not a patentable process. It is akin to various other
ordinary human processes such as walking, swimming, and singing.
We may nevertheless still find it imaginable that a sufficiently gifted
person could associate ideas in a way so intimately private that the result
would be completely inaccessible to anyone but the inventor. It would,
hence, be possible that in a world in which, for example, no-one had ever
played any games, once, however, someone would invent a game which
no-one ever played. A person would simply have to undertake the task
of assembling certain ideas in absolutely unheard of ways. The following
remarks on chess from the Investigations, however, provide convincing
evidence to the contrary:
But it is just the queer thing about intention, about the mental process, that the existence of
a custom, of a technique, is not necessary to it. That, for example, it is imaginable that two
people should play chess in a world in which otherwise no games existed; and even that
they should begin a game of chess – and then be interrupted.
But isn’t chess defined by its rules? And how are these rules present in the mind of the
person who is intending to play chess?28
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone
obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a
report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. To obey a rule, to make a report,
to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language
means to be master of a technique.
It is, of course, imaginable that two people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games
should sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and even with
all the appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say they
were playing chess. But let us now imagine a game of chess translated according to certain
rules into a series of actions which we do not ordinarily associate with a game, say into
26 The burden of proof is hence on the patent clerk, many of whom have stated that there
is a general incentive in the U.S. Patent Office to maximize the number of approvals – of
which the current rate is 10,000 every three weeks. See J. Gleik, “Patently Absurd”, New
York Times Magazine, March 12, 2000.
27 Wittgenstein, supra n. 9, §204.
28 Wittgenstein, supra n. 9, 181e.
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yells and stamping of feet. And let us now imagine those two people yelling and stamping
instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and that this in such a way that
their procedure is still translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still
be inclined to say that they were playing a game? What right would we have to say so?29
What has to be accepted, the given, is – one could say – forms of life.30
It is, therefore, entirely appropriate that intellectual property law seek
to exclude the appropriation of processes so embedded in our ordinary
practices that they might well be called “forms of life”. Although we
cannot patent gaming, it is permissible to patent types of games, as well
as particular ways of playing them. In other words, while forms of life
cannot be appropriated, each of their instantiations can, in principle, be
subject to intellectual property rights. The upshot is that any concept that
can actually be marketed can also be patented.
This brings us to what is perhaps the greatest interpretive difficulty
in the notion of intellectual property: the criterion of “non-obviousness”.
It would indeed seem that the potential to obtain a market price would
guarantee that a given process would meet this criterion. However, this is
unfortunately not the case. For it is possible nowadays to patent all sorts of
products and processes of the most banal stylistic distinction. Staying only
within the realm of games, we already have a wealth of examples. Take for
instance the game of “pictionary”. This is roughly a version of charades
transformed into the drawing of pictures representing the word in question
which must be discovered by one team before the members of an opposing
team. In order to play this game, all that is required is paper, pencil, people,
and a watch. Nevertheless, this game is now patented, which means that it
is now forbidden to sell the game or to make commercial use of the title
without first obtaining written permission from the holder of the patent.31
Furthermore, many would even argue that we are ethically required to only
write, record, or utter the word “pictionary” when referring in fact to the
official trademarked version.32
29 Wittgenstein, supra n. 9, §199–200.
30 Wittgenstein, supra n. 9, 226e.
31 Conversely, a game such as charades would be much less lucrative to patent since it is
played entirely with the human body, which would of course be most awkward to sell. As
for games such as chess and checkers, they are not subject to intellectual property rights in
virtue of the fact that they have been sufficiently widespread for so long that such rights do
not apply.
32 It is, therefore, quite common nowadays for a company to attempt to protect its trade-
marked name through advertisements, reminding everyone that its product or service is,
in fact, patented and that its name should only be used (either in writing or in speech)
when referring to that specific company’s product or service. Xerox for example recently
placed an advertisement in Wired Magazine, in order to discourage people from using its
name when referring to photocopies made by photocopy machines manufactured by other
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It is far from certain that a pictorial version of a game as common
as charades is, in fact, non-obvious. People have been playing pictionary
since long before its commercial version appeared. And different groups
of people certainly played it slightly differently since one can imagine
countless ways of transforming charades into pictorial form. The essence
of a game is not a process that can be precisely described. It is for this
reason that games, like many other relatively obvious kinds of inven-
tion (especially computer programs) are continually patented by simply
changing a few more or less significant details of someone else’s patented
product. Consequently, innumerable patents are routinely granted, based
on characteristics that are entirely obvious, merely because the product in
question can obtain a market value. For example, U.S. patent #5,960,411
recently granted the internet company, Amazon, exclusive rights to allow
its customers to purchase a product online with only a single action, such
as a mouse click, key press, or sound.33 Since there was as yet no explicit
mention of such a process in the relevant literature, the patent office felt
compelled to accept it as novel and non-obvious.
Conversely, in 1993 Lower Court Judge Patti B. Saris ruled against a
patent infringement suit concerning an intricate computerized strategy of
managing a multi-tiered portfolio of mutual funds, stating that “mental
processes and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable” for “they
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work”. Saris decided
that the so-called invention was no more than a way of calculating: “The
same functions could be performed, albeit less efficiently, by an accountant
armed with pencil, paper, calculator and a filing system.” The patent gives
its owner a monopoly, she pointed out: “patenting an accounting system
necessary to carry on a certain type of business is tantamount to a patent
on the business itself.”34 Wittgenstein’s remarks clearly lend support to
Seres’ ruling since it rejects the right to lay claim to ordinary human
processes of buying and selling, i.e., to business itself – a non-patentable
idea. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed that ruling in 1998 and
companies. We are told not to employ the word “xerox” either in the form of a noun (“a
xerox copy”) or in the form of a verb (“to xerox”) if it does not imply the use of a genuine
Xerox Photocopy Machine. It is often the case that the name of the first major brand of
a new invention becomes ordinarily employed to refer to the invention itself. The names
“aspirin” and “jaccuzzi” are notable examples. When this happens, the company loses its
exclusive rights to that name. It is certainly easier to say “Xerox” than “photocopy” and
so the company of the same name has good reason to worry. It suggests, therefore, that we
simply say “copy” instead, even though in many contexts that word does not always carry
the same meaning as photocopy.
33 Gleik, supra n. 26.
34 Ibid.
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reinstated the patent, finding that “software – even if it merely manipu-
lates numbers, juggling them and transforming them into other numbers –
produces something tangible.”35
A new and particularly questionable application of intellectual property
law is that of sports moves patents. It is now possible for a sports player or
athlete to patent any ingenious movements yielding a significant competi-
tive advantage and/or aesthetic value. For example, a patent actually exists
for executing a tennis stroke while wearing a kneepad (U.S. 5,993,366:
“The tennis racket is swung toward a tennis ball so as to hit the tennis
ball with the racket . . .”).36 If a new movement can give a sports player or
athlete a measurable advantage, it is therefore a useful process.37 Similarly,
sports moves often have an aesthetic value when considered choreograph-
ically. Broadcast rights of sports events are already bought and sold as
choreography. Hence it may be legally feasible for a sports player or athlete
to sell the execution rights of his or her move or moves to others, as well
as the broadcast rights that his or her choreographic work represents to the
general media. It is already the case that “stage business” gags and jokes
are copyrightable.38 Consequently, the same could be said of “slam dunks,
pitching stances, golf swings and Fosbery Flops”.39
What is metaphysically unsound about this possible eventuality is again
the notion that the will of the sports player or athlete is the cause of his
or her idea. By introducing something new, he or she enriches the world
– offering to others certain possibilities previously unavailable. Still, this
perspective overlooks the organic nature of utility in general. If a sports
move is considered useful, it is but the result of the nature of an activity
within the given sport. One must remember that during the evolution of
a sport, or any other practice, new movements most often manifest them-
selves somewhat unconsciously. Games for example, continually produce
varying contexts in which new moves spontaneously suggest themselves
to players. And when the new idea comes to mind, it is not a new insight
into the private realm, but rather a new reaction to the external world.
As Wittgenstein states, “to understand a sentence means to understand a
language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.”40
To this example we could add other forms of life such as gaming and sport,
e.g., chess and basketball. Wittgenstein stresses that these activities are
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 R.M. Kunstadt, F.S. Kieff and R.G. Kramer, supra n. 22, C3.
38 Ibid., C4 cites Nimmer, supra n. 1 at sec. 2.13.
39 Ibid., C2.
40 Wittgenstein, supra n. 9, §199.
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customs, uses, and indeed institutions.41 The willing subject who comes
up with a novel action in such contexts is hence guided by them. The
context itself engenders the willed action, for as Wittgenstein points out,
one cannot will to will:
One imagines the willing subject here as something without any mass (without any inertia);
as a motor which has no inertia in itself to overcome. And so it is only mover, not moved.
That is: One can say “I will, but my body does not obey me” – but not: “My will does not
obey me.” (Augustine.)
But in the sense in which I cannot fail to will, I cannot try to will either.42
This picture of the will as unmoved mover is at the root of the erroneous
metaphysical assumption that individuals are the masters of their own
ideas. Since, as Augustine states, it is absurd to say that “My will does not
obey me”, it becomes possible to fall into the conceptual trap of thinking
that the will itself has a master, and that this office is held by each indi-
vidual mind. From there, philosophers furthering the legacy of Descartes
have postulated the will as an essentially private metaphysical entity.
Today, this assumption seems to have become sufficiently embedded in
Western ideology that it continues to guide a wide array of eminently
influential economic and scientific enterprises – from intellectual property
law to cognitive science.
It is important to remember that patents not only exist for the prac-
tical purposes of protecting business, for even private non-commercial
reproductions can be forbidden by the patent holder despite the fact that
they cannot realistically be sanctioned. This stipulation openly reveals the
presumption that a concept (if not an idea) can in fact belong to a particular
person. The object of concern is not merely a commercial possession, but
also an conceptual one. Whoever reproduces another’s intellectual prop-
erty without permission, even for personal use, becomes a thief.43 Since
such theft is not of any material nature, it can therefore only be of a purely
intellectual nature. Yet, as Wittgenstein shows, this peculiar sort of feat can
only be accomplished by a metaphysical chimera.
If the somewhat misleading notion of intellectual property continues to
function in modern Western culture, it is largely because it corresponds
to the practical necessity of orienting oneself in the world of meaning.
Foucault elucidates this indispensable role of the notion of authorship with
the following perspicacious remarks.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., §618.
43 Literary quotations obviously excepted.
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The author allows a limitation of the cancerous and dangerous proliferation of signific-
ations within a world where one is thrifty not only with one’s resources and riches, but
also with one’s discourses and their significations. The author is the principle of thrift in
the proliferation of meaning. As a result, we must entirely reverse the traditional idea of
the author. We are accustomed to saying that the author is the genial creator of a work in
which he deposits, with infinite wealth and generosity, an inexhaustible world of signific-
ations. We are used to thinking that the author is so different from all other men, and so
transcendent with regard to all languages that, as soon as he speaks, meaning begins to
proliferate, to proliferate indefinitely.
The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source of significations
which fill a work; the author does not precede the works, he is a certain functional prin-
ciple by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one
impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition,
and recomposition of fiction. In fact, if we are accustomed to presenting the author as a
genius, as a perpetual surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make him function
in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an ideological product, since
we represent him as the opposite of his historically real function. The author is, therefore,
the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of
meaning.44
The notion of authorship being hence intrinsically paradoxical, it has natur-
ally engendered the contemporary expression “intellectual property” that
is all the more troublesome. It may, therefore, be of some use to cleanse
this expression a bit by examining how it might be re-employed more
conscientiously. Any expression may come to carry an absurd or dated
meaning. This does not, however, keep us from continuing to use it, so long
as we know what it really means (or should mean) today. Thus, we often
defend ourselves from reproach over the literal meaning of a sentence by
replying that it is just an old expression, obviously not intended to be taken
literally. When we say for example “You are going to catch cold” this does
not mean that the cold temperature is actually going to trap itself within the
person’s body in the form of a cold or flu. Although this is, nevertheless,
what the expression more or less meant originally. This fact does not keep
us from continuing to use the same expression, knowing full well that its
intended meaning is now quite different (or should be different). According
to Wittgenstein, the same is true of philosophical expressions that need
now and again to be purged of their dated or erroneous usage before they
can be correctly re-employed:
Sometimes an expression has to be withdrawn from language and sent for cleaning, – then
it can be put back into circulation. 45
Up to now, the results of our “cleaning” have shown that the expres-
sion “intellectual property” is partly metaphysical nonsense derived from
44 Foucault, supra n. 15, 159.
45 Wittgenstein, supra n. 3, 39e.
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the purely ideological concept of the author/inventor. All the same, this
realization cannot lead to a complete rejection of the concept. Such a stance
would amount to an absurd position of metaphysical nominalism, contra-
dicting all of our most common experiences of choosing and willing. It is
enough to admit that the expression “intellectual property” has no meaning
outside of the realm of business law. There, at best, it justifies certain
reasonable protections to creators and to trademarks, providing important
points of reference to the consumer. At worst, it permits the exploitation
of creators and the establishment of monopolies. Intellectual property is
hence better understood as a purely commercial appropriation than as a
conceptual one. This distinction should be retained at least implicitly if
not explicitly within both the language of law and the language of arts and
letters. Hence with respect to law, we could at least begin by no longer
criminalizing (even in principle) the private reproduction of intellectual
property carried out without written permission from the rights holder.
And with respect to arts and letters (excluding biographical research and
bibliographical citations), we would no longer hear the questions that have
been re-hashed for so long: “Who really spoke? Is it really he and not
someone else? With what authenticity or originality? And what part of
his deepest self did he express in his discourse?” Instead, there would
be other questions, like these: “What are the modes of existence of this
discourse? Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can
appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where there is room
for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject-functions?”46
This would not entail banishing certain questions so much as employing
them in another fashion. The concept of plagiarism for example would still
exist, only we would no longer consider it the theft of personal property.
It would be perceived, rather, as a violation of our intellectual heritage,
compromising its historical integrity.
Lastly, one central question that still remains is the following: “What
exactly is the object that bears the stamp of original thought in general,
and of genius in particular?” To this, Wittgenstein provides only a vague
answer:
You could attach prices to thoughts. Some cost a lot, some a little. And how does one pay
for thoughts? The answer, I think, is: with courage.47
One might say: “Genius is talent exercised with courage.” 48
46 Foucault, supra n. 15, 160.
47 Wittgenstein, supra n. 3, 52e.
48 Ibid., 38e, or “Genius is what makes us forget the master’s talent”, ibid., 43e, or “Only
where genius wears thin can you see the talent”, ibid.
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Thus, if we accept with Wittgenstein that there can be no private psychical
realm of language and will, the feeling of accomplishment one experi-
ences after completing an original work should not so much be a godly
exaltation of world-making, as the satisfaction of having proven one’s
courage to insightfully carry out certain particularly salient ideas to further
points of consequence. Courage is essential. For it is courage that pushes
one to surpass oneself conceptually, and ultimately to develop and main-
tain the talent that is indispensable to genius. Hence, Wittgenstein does
not supply any firm theoretical grounds for granting intellectual property
rights. Rather, he offers a critique of intellectual property that guards
against reaching for rough and ready metaphysical assumptions in an
attempt to satisfy the pressing demands of practical legal necessity.
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